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INTRODUCTION

In re Elsner1 grew out of the rejection of the plant patent applications of
Mr. Elsner and Mr. Zary. Mr. Elsner is a plant breeder who resides in Ger
2
many and who maintains and "invents" new geraniums. In 1997 he filed an
*

J.D. candidate, December 2005. This Note is dedicated to Dorothy "Doe" Frostick.
Also, I would like to sincerely thank all of those who helped me in thinking about and writing this
Note. I would specifically like to thank Professor Roberta J. Morris, Professor John F. Duffy, and
Jenn Kozar for their many ideas and great advice on early drafts. Finally, while I cannot list them
all, I would like to thank my Note Editors for their hard work, the Michigan Law Review Editorial
Board for their helpful comments and tremendous patience, and the MLR Associate Editors for their
citechecking and proofreading. All mistakes are my own.
I.

381 F.3d 1125 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

2.

Elsner, 381 F.3d at 1126-27.
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application for a Plant Breeder's Rights ("PBR") certificate3 at the European
Community Plant Variety Office that was subsequently published.4 The ap
plication was for a new type of geranium that originated as a mutation of a
parent geranium named Pendec.5 The published application disclosed the
names and addresses of the plant breeder, a statement of botanical classifica
tion, and a provisional denomination for the plant. In 1998, Mr. Elsner sold
the geranium in Germany.6 Meanwhile, Mr. Zary filed a PBR certificate in
7
South Africa that claimed a new variety of rose plant called the JACopper.
Information about the JACopper included a published certificate that speci
fied how to contact the JACopper breeder and his South African agent.8 Mr.
Zary sold the JACopper in South Africa and Zambia as early as 1996.9 Both
Mr. Elsner and Mr. Zary tried to patent their plants in the United States un
°
der the Plant Patent Act1 ("PPA") but were rejected under 35 U.S.C.
'
'
§ 102(b), the on-sale bar. The patent office stated that the published PBR
applications coupled with the overseas sale of the inventions sufficiently
placed the public in possession of the invention to make it not novel and
2
therefore unpatentable.1
Mr. Elsner and Mr. Zary appealed the rejections and the court was faced
with the question of whether, for the plants of Elsner and Zary, a publication
3
that met all of the requirements of 35 U. S.C. § 102 except enablement1
might be placed in the possession of the public by a related public foreign

3. A registered PBR certificate denotes that a limited monopoly is given to breeder of a
uniform, distinct, and stable plant variety.
4.

Elsner, 381 F.3d at 1126-27.

5.

Id.

6.

Id. at 1127.

7.

Id.

8.

Id.

9.

Id.

10.

35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (2004).

11. Elsner, 381 F.3d at 1127. The patent language relating to plants is held in 35 U.S.C.
§§ 161-164 and described infra Section l.B. The relevant novelty sections state:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a
printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant
for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country
or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the applica
tion for patent in the United States . . . .
35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b) (2004).
12.

Elsner, 381 F.3d at 1127.

13. A reference must be enabling in order to bar a patent. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Mustek
Sys., Inc. , 340 F.3d 1314, 1324 & n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("The anticipation analysis asks solely
whether the prior art reference discloses and enables the claimed invention . . . ."). As will be dis
cussed infra Section 11.B, In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 935 (C. C.P.A. 1962), changes the
enablement requirements of anticipatory references slightly for plants.
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4
sale of the invention.1 The court held that the sale could be coupled with the
15
publication in order to create a statutory bar to a U.S. patent.
The lack of a consistent theory among Eisner's references, test, and ex
plicit language makes the scope of Elsner hard to discern. For instance, the
Federal Circuit first reiterated the bright-line rule that foreign sales coupled
with a publication cannot be a statutory bar,16 but then found that for plants,
a foreign sale coupled with a publication serves as a statutory bar because it
7
enables those skilled in the art to access the plant invention.1

Second, the court stated that it "disagree[d] with Appellants' contention
that [its] holding will operate to create a printed publication bar whenever a
non-enabling publication and a foreign sale are involved [because] . . . 'there
8
are inherent differences between plants and manufactured articles.' "1 Spe
cifically, the court distinguished the plants and utility inventions because the
plants at issue require asexual reproduction to replicate. 19 But the Elsner
court relies on a case involving § 101 patentable inventions-specifically
microorganisms-which, as this Note will discuss in Section II.C, states the
similar predicament between asexually reproducing plants and microorgan
isms.
Finally, although the court stated that it only distinguished plants be
cause it "perceive[d] a difference between plants and statutorily distinct
inventions,"20 it relied extensively on other. sources that maintain that there
should be no discrimination between plants and other inventions. For in
stance, the court quoted approvingly both the Court of Customs and Patent
1
Appeals ("CCPA") in In re LeGrice2 and the United States Patent and
Trademark Office ("USPTO")--each of which came to a broad conclusion
that plants and utility patents should have the same § 102(b) bars.22 It also
cited the CCPA, which stated that plants should be treated the same as util
ity inventions.23 By broadening the references that may be considered as a

14. See Elsner, 381 F.3d at 1128 ("The particular question thus before us is whether evidence
of the foreign sale of a claimed reproducible plant variety may enable an otherwise non-enabled
printed publication disclosing that plant, thereby creating a§ 102(b) bar.").
15. Id. at 1126. The panel consisted of Judge Lourie, Judge Clevenger, and Judge Bryson,
with Judge Lourie writing the opinion. The case was decided on August 16, 2004.
16. Id. at 1128 ("Ordinarily, foreign sales of an invention in combination with a publication
will not constitute a bar because such a result would circumvent the established rules that neither
non-enabling publications nor foreign sales can bar one's right to a patent.").
17.

Id. at 1128-29.

18.

Id. at 1129 (quoting In re LeGrice, 301F.2d 929, 935 (C.C.P.A. 1962)).

19. See id. at 1129 ("In the case of plant patents, the touchstone of the statutory subject matter is asexual reproduction of a unique biological organism.").
20.

Id.

21.

In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929 (C.C.P.A. 1962).

22. Elsner, 381 F.3d at 1130, relying on LeGrice, 301 F.2d at 935, stated that "[i]n its deci
sion reversing the Board, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals discussed at length its view that
§ 102(b) applies to plant patents in the same way that it applies to utility patents, but acknowledged
the distinction between plants and other patentable subject matter."
23.

The Elsner court, relying on LeGrice, 301 F.2d at 936, stated that:
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bar to novelty under § 102, the court effectively made it harder to obtain a
patent on a plant, thereby discriminating against them.
One reason Elsner may seem confusing is that it tried to balance con
flicting congressional directives. On the one hand, the court considered that
2
Congress did not want plants to be discriminated against. 4 On the other
hand, the court had to consider that in the Patent Act, Congress had set cate
gories of prior art, the combination of which is generally disfavored for
25
determinations of patentability. Finally, the court considered its gut notions
of fairness: that a dirty, rotten scoundrel is printing material and selling
plants abroad but still being allowed to patent them in the United States be
cause of a technicality. Elsner balanced these concerns by precluding
novelty for plants if the prior acts put the public in possession of the plant.
This Note argues that these congressional commands Elsner needed to bal
ance do not actually require different outcomes and instead indicate that
2
courts should extend Eisner's "possession test" 6 to all utility inventions.
Some may critique reconciling the discrimination of plant patents with
other utility patents by changing all of the patent laws governing utility pat
ents to the level of the narrow category of plant patents as similar to moving
2
a mountain to meet a stone. 7 This critique misses the point; the Elsner court
recognized that in a progressive world where foreign knowledge is more
available to inventors, the circumstances that determine public possession
will also need to regularly change. Stated in a different way, the criteria for
public possession will need to change in order to maintain a continuously
strict patentability regime. Courts must constantly reconsider the Patent Act
in light of continuous technology changes if they intend to maintain the conThe [CCPA] court concluded that Congress had not indicated that § 102(b) should be applied
differently to plant patents than to other inventions, and the court reiterated that the clause 'de
scribed in a printed publication' has been interpreted with respect to whether the publication
has in fact conveyed such knowledge of an invention to the public as to put the public in pos
session of the invention.

Elsner, 381 F.3d at 1130.
24. This concern was set out in the Committee Reports during the enactment of the Plant
Patent Act when stating that: "The purpose of this bill is to afford agriculture, so far as predicable,
the same opportunity to participate in the benefits of the patent system as has been given industry
....The bill will remove the existing discrimination between plant developers and industrial inven
tors." S. REP. No. 71-315, at 1 (1930); LeGrice, 301 F.2d at 932 (stating that this report was
identical to a report filed by the House Committee on Patents).
25. 35 U.S.C.§ 102(b) (2004); Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp. , 713 F.2d 760, 771 (Fed.
Cir. 1983).Recently, a bill has been introduced into Congress that would explicitly change the prior
art standards for plants to be stricter than those for utility inventions. But, little congressional action
has been taken on this proposed legislation since it was introduced in January 2005. See infra note
86.
26. I will call the test for novelty used in Elsner the "possession test." This test, as applied in
Elsner and LeGrice, asks a technology-neutral question of "whether one skilled in the art to which
the invention pertains could take the description of the invention in the printed publication and com
bine it with his own knowledge of the particular art and from this combination be put in possession
of the invention on which a patent is sought." Elsner, 381 F.3d at 1128 (quoting LeGrice, 301 F.2d at
939).
27. Utility patents are those inventions patented under§ 101 of the Patent Act. Some exam
ples of things that can be patented under§ 101 are the steam engine or a zipper.
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stant strictness of the patent standard;28 Elsner merely reflects this kind of
reconsideration. As technology changes, courts should be adapting outdated
laws to reflect the changing world.
This Note will show that one can read Elsner broadly to encompass both
plant-type and widget-type inventions, and that applying Elsner to both
plants and widgets is within the current statutory framework and case law.
Such a reading would change the § 102 bar for inventions patentable under
§ 10i29 (hereinafter referred to as "widgets") as well as for plants. Part I of
this Note argues that congressional sources require a flexible test-one that
does not prejudice any objects under the Patent Act. Part II discusses the
judicial interpretation of the Patent Act prior to Elsner in order to argue first,
that past cases disfavor discrimination based on invention type and second,
that courts have already applied a broad reading of Elsner to non-plant in
ventions. Part III shows that the move toward harmonization of U.S. laws
with international standards is especially strong in intellectual property. As a
result, Part III argues that courts should pay attention to international
sources and harmonize U.S. laws with international standards. Such har
monization requires considering foreign sales as prior art for all inventions.
Thus, courts should apply the Elsner court's "possession test" to plants and
§ 101 inventions, effectively removing the territorial boundary for sales that
make inventions accessible to the U.S. public.
I. CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS
This Part will argue that the language and amendments of the governing
statutes, the Patent Act and the Plant Patent Act ("PPA"), support a broad
reading of Elsner that expands its "possession test" to widgets. Section I.A
will first discuss the historical roots of the Patent Act and conclude that the
framers of the Patent Act envisioned that the novelty requirement would be
based on community knowledge similar to Eisner's possession test. Section
LB will then look to the language of the Plant Patent Act and its amend
ments to show that the statute's goal was to treat plant inventions the same
as utility inventions. It then argues that congressional acts targeted changing
the status of the utility inventions rather than that of plant inventions in or
der to maintain such nondiscrimination. Finally, Section l.C will explore the
Plant Variety Protection Act ("PV PA"), a distinct statute that Congress used
to set up a separate regime for objects that require disparate treatment. Part
l.C argues that since Congress did not set up a similarly distinct statutory
regime for asexually reproducing plants, courts should treat these plants the
same as utility inventions.

28. See infra text accompanying notes 44-56 for an example of how courts have adapted
laws in response to changing technology.
29.

35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). For the statutory text, see infra note 33.
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A. Historical Roots
Even the earliest tests for novelty have their roots in a test of public ac
cessibility, meaning that a novelty determination should change with the
varying level of community knowledge. Historic cases show that varying
levels of community knowledge correspond with changes in the novelty re
quirement such that as information becomes more accessible to the
community, the conditions for patentability change. In 1615, the King's
Bench explained the need for the novelty requirement in Clothworkers of
Jpswitch:
[I]f a man hath brought in a new invention and a new trade within the
kingdom, in peril of his life, and consumption of his estate or stock or if a
man hath made a new discovery of any thing, in such cases the King ... in
recompense of his costs and travail, may grant by charter unto him, that he
only shall use such a trade or trafique for a certain time, because at first the
people of the kingdom are ignorant, and have not the knowledge or skill to
use it .

.

. . 30

This rationale resulted in the traditional finding that someone could ob
tain a patent for novel inventions, that is, inventions brought into a state
where the people did not otherwise have possession. Later, in 1850, Gayler
v. Wilder based novelty on community possession, stating:
If the foreign invention had been printed or patented, it was already given
to the world and open to the people of this country, as well as of others,
upon reasonable inquiry. They would therefore derive no advantage from
the invention here.It would confer no benefit upon the community, and the
inventor therefore is not considered to be entitled to the reward. But, if the
foreign discovery is not patented, nor described in a printed publication, it
might be known and used in remote places for ages, and the people of this
country be unable to profit by it. The means of obtaining knowledge would
not be within their reach; and as far as their interest is concerned, it would

be the same thing as if the improvement had never been discovered. 31

Both Clothworkers of Jpswitch and Gayler v. Wilder propose basing the
novelty of an invention on whether the community could access the inven
tion before the time of "reward."
The Patent Act embodies the concern for community access to informa
tion espoused in Clothworkers of Jpswitch and Gayler v. Wilder. The
Framers of the Constitution granted Congress the right to protect inventions
in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8. 32 In 1870, Congress acted pursuant to this

30.

The Clothworkers of lpswitch Case, (1615) 78 Eng. Rep. 147, 148 (K.B.).

31.

Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S.477, 497 (1850).

3 2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries").
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power, followed the Gayer v. Wilder rationale, and inserted a novelty limita
tion into the Patent Act.33
Section 102 of the Patent Act lays out the type and time limitations for
actions and publications that may bar a patent from issuing.3 4 The most fre
quently employed of these bars is § 102(b), the "on-sale bar."35 Section
102(b) says that the inventor may not obtain a patent on an invention if "the
invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a for
eign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year
prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States.''3 6 Thus,
U.S. publications, patents, sales, and uses of the invention will prevent a
finding of novelty under§ 102(a) and (b), while the only foreign actions that
will prevent such a finding are foreign publications and foreign patents.3 7
38
Similar to Clothworkers of Ipswitch and Gayler v. Wilder, where novelty
hinged on the community's access to information, § 102(a) and (b) made a
territorial distinction between the actions that would preclude a finding of
novelty at a time when access to overseas information was difficult.39
Elsner is a correct application of the historical Clothworkers of lpswitch
and Gayler v. Wilder rationale even though such a broad test would arguably
undermine the language of§ 102. 40 Recall that Eisner's references consisted
of a short foreign publication generally describing a plant and the foreign
sale of that plant.41 In such a case, if one looked only to the § 102 catego
ries-contrary to the Elsner holding--one would find the invention novel
because the foreign publication insufficiently described the plant and the
foreign sale is not covered by § 102(b).42 But, by instead looking to the
flexible approach of Gayler and Clothworkers of lpswitch, the court can find
the invention is not new because the § 102 categories are not strict; they
merely represent a tilt of the law in favor of precluding novelty based on a
community's ability to access domestic versus foreign inventions. Based on

33. This requirement is expressed in § 101 of the Patent Act, which states that anyone who
"invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,
or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent . . . ." 35 U.S.C.§ 101 (2001) (em
phasis added). The procedure for determining novelty involves examining each pertinent publication
or activity (known as prior art) reference to determine if it anticipates the claimed invention. CRAIG
HOVEY, THE PATENT PROCESS: A GUIDE TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FOR THE INFORMATION AGE
138-39 (2002).
34.

35 u.s.c. § 102 (2004).

35.

ROGER

E.

SCHECHTER & JoHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF

COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS

325 (2003).

36.

35 U.S.C.§ 102(b) (emphasis added).

37.

35 U.S.C.§§ 102(a)-(b).

38. The Clothworkers of lpswitch Case, (1615) 78 Eng. Rep. 147, 148 (K.B.); Gayler
Wilder, 51 U.S. 477, 497 (1850).

v.

39.

35 U.S.C.§ 102(b) is based on an 1870 statute.

40.

See The Clothworkers oflpswitch Case, 78 Eng. Rep. at 148; see also Gayler, 51 U.S. at

497.
41.

In re Elsner, 381 F.3d 1125 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

42.

Id.
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this understanding, just as was done in Elsner, a court would preclude a
finding of novelty if it found the U.S. public could reasonably access the
plant in order to sufficiently make and use the invention. Using such a flexi
ble test, courts should reinterpret the Patent Act in light of technology that
makes information more accessible to the public. This is consistent with
Elsner where the court found the plant in possession of the public and did
not allow the inventor to obtain a patent.43 Under the historical rationale and
Elsner, a court should ask whether the U.S. public is in possession of the
invention. The rationale of this test applies regardless of invention type.
The continuous reinterpretation of the "printed publication" clause also
bolsters the argument that courts should dynamically interpret the Patent Act
novelty requirement based on an assessment of community access.44 The
dynamic, technology-based interpretation of the "printed publication" clause
45
of the Patent Act began as early as 1937 when Gulliksen v. Halberg stated
that the § 102 printed publication bar could no longer be restricted to its
outdated interpretation that only things printed with movable type46 could be
a "printed publication." Instead, Gulliksen found that "the art of printing has
undergone many radical changes so that at present day it would be almost
impossible to have any printing done with the process in use in 1870" and
the printed limitation was merely to ensure "a wider spread of the informa
tion."4 7 Thus, the court determined that methods of printing which provide
"distribution and accessibility" of the work to the public, and that provide
works that are permanent and legible,48 are- within the § 102 language.49
Thus, in Gulliksen, the court reinterpreted the language of the Patent Act in
light of the changing technology scene to comply with the spirit of the stat
ute.
Courts now interpret the printed publication bar based on the purpose of
the statute even if this requires loosely interpreting the statutory language.
For instance, when analyzing whether microfilm would be a printed publica-

43. Elsner specifically used this public possession inquiry: "Because the published applica
tions, combined with the foreign sales of the plants, placed the claimed inventions in the possession
of the public, we therefore hold that they are proper§ 102(b) anticipatory references that may bar
patentability." Elsner, 381 F.3d at 1129.
44.

See 35 U.S.C.§ 102(a) (2000).

45.

75 U.S.P.Q. 252 (C. C.P.A. 1937).

46. Id. at 253 ("[The printed publication clause] appeared for the first time in the Act of
1870, and at that time, a printed publication could be produced in only one way, i.e., pieces of indi
vidual type were set by hand and after an amount equivalent to a page had been composed, the type
were locked in a frame, the face of the type treated with a coating of ink and the paper was then
pressed on the type to produce an imprint."); Wesley Kobylak, Annotation, Meaning of Term
"Printed Publication" Under 35 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) and (b), Denying Patentability to Invention
Described in Printed P ublication Before Invention by Application More Than One Year Prior to
Date of Patent Application, 70 A.LR. FED. 796,§ 6 (1984).
47.

Gulliksen, 75 U.S.P.Q. at 253.

48. Note that the court not only considered that the printing methods had improved since
1870 but also that the library systems had improved in order to make even a single copy of a work
more accessible. Gulliksen, 75 U.S.P.Q. 252 (C. C.P.A. 1937).
49.

Id.

November 2005]

353

Planting a Standard

tion bar under § 102, the CCPA took the view that "the 'probability of dis
semination' of an item very often has little to do with whether or not it is
'printed' in the sense of that word when it was introduced into the patent
5°
statutes in 1836." Further, the Federal Circuit often reads "printed publica
tion" as a unitary concept even though this reading does not give meaning to
both of the words "printed" and "publication" from the 1836 Patent Act lan
guage.51 The Federal Circuit has traced the patent statute back to its roots to
find that the printed publication bar of § 102 was designed to prevent an
inventor from taking material that was already in the possession of the pub
lic.5 2 Jn re ttyer,53 citing this history, stated that when this purpose of§ 102
is met, the public dissemination reading is valid even if meaning was not
given to both of the words "printed" and "publication."54
Congress has not amended the language of the Patent Act in response to
and many subsequent reinterpretations of the Patent Act.55 This
silence offers at least some evidence that the case-by-case interpretation of
the Patent Act language based on the changing technology scene is a proper
method to interpret the Patent Act for all types of inventions.5 6 Just like Gul
liksen, one can read Elsner to reinterpret the Patent Act to respond to
technologies that make foreign objects more accessible to U.S. citizens.
Eisner's holding applies only to plants, leaving open a broader interpre
tation:
Gulliksen

The particular question thus before us is whether evidence of the foreign
sale of a claimed reproducible plant variety may enable an otherwise non
enabled printed publication disclosing that plant, thereby

§

creating a
57

102(b) bar. On that issue of first impression, we hold in the affirmative.

Since the holding of Elsner states that it decides only whether a§ 102(b)
bar resulting from foreign sales coupled with publications should apply to
58
plant patents, the decision leaves open the possibility for movement in fa
vor of harmonization of U.S. law with foreign laws. Currently, foreign laws

50.

In re Wyer, 655F.2d 221, 226 (C.C.P.A. 1981).

51. See, e.g., In re Klopfenstein, 380F.3d 1345, 1348 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("[O]ur precedent
considers the term 'printed publication' to be a unitary concept that may not correspond exactly to
what the term 'printed publication' meant when it was introduced into the patent statutes in 1836.");
Browning Mfg. Co. v. Bros, Inc., 126 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 499 (D. Minn. 1960) ("The word 'printed,' as
enacted in the statute, modifies 'publication'; they must be read together.").
52.

ttyer, 655F.2d at 226 (citing In re Bayer, 568F.2d 1357, 1359 (C.C.P.A. 1978)).

53.

Id. at 221.

54. Id. at 226 ("[I]nterpretation of the words 'printed' and 'publication' to mean 'probability
of dissemination' and 'public accessibility,' respectively, now seems to render their use in the phrase
'printed publication' somewhat redundant.").
55.

See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2005).

56. Hibbs v. Winn, 124 S. Ct. 2276, 2292 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("It merits empha
sis, however, that prolonged congressional silence in response to a settled interpretation of a federal
statute provides powerful support for maintaining the status quo.").
57.

In re Elsner, 381F.3d 1125, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

58.

Id.
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5
look to sales outside their borders to determine novelty; 9 harmonization
would mean that the United States looks at sales in foreign countries when
deciding whether the U.S. public is in possession of the invention.
Moreover, since Eisner's test is not unique to plants, courts can easily
extend its test to non-plant inventions. Courts could apply the "possession
test" to inventions patentable under § 1 0 1 just as it could be applied to
plants because it uses a technology-neutral inquiry of:
[W]hether one skilled in the art to which the invention pertains could take
the description of the invention in the printed publication and combine it
with his own knowledge of the particular art and from this combination be
6()

put in possession of the invention on which a patent is sought.

Elsner further says the analysis should not tum on whether the prior art
specifically meets § 1 02, but only whether it enables one to access the in
vention-an inquiry that would not require the judge to know the
technology in question.61 Working through this analysis for plants, the court
says:
When a publication identifies the plant that is invented or discovered and a
foreign sale occurs that puts one of ordinary skill in the art in possession of
the plant itself, which, based on the level of ordinary skill in the art, per

62

mits asexual reproduction without undue experimentation .. . .

One can easily see, however, that for any invention the "combination of
facts and events [might] so directly convey the essential knowledge of the
invention that the sale combines with the publication to erect a statutory
63
bar." Therefore, even when the court applied the test to this case to deter
mine that the public did have access, Eisner's analysis never depended on
64
anything unique to plants.
Since Eisner's test is not unique to plants and the holding does not speak
to whether it should apply to widgets, Eisner's test can extend to non-plant
inventions. Applying Eisner's "possession test" to widgets would confirm
historical rationales that the Patent Act should be reinterpreted to account
for technology changes that allow communities to better access information.
The next Section will discuss why, in addition to following historical ration
ale, such an expansion would support the express goals of the Plant Patent
Act.

59.

Id.

60.

Id. (quoting In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 939 (C.C. P.A. 1962)).

61. Id. at 1129-30 ("However, the precise focus of the analysis is not whether the foreign
sales are themselves § 102(b) prior art, but whether the publication has placed the claimed invention
in the possession of the public before the critical date.").
62.

Id. at 1129.

63.

Id.

64. Id. ("Because the public may have had access to the claimed inventions through the
foreign sales of the plants, from which the claimed plants may be reproduced, it may fairly be said
that the PBR applications are adequately enabled.").
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B. The Plant Patent Act and Subsequent A mendments
Congress enacted the Townsend-Purnell Plant Patent Act65 to give plant
inventors the same rights as inventors of § 101 widgets. The PPA protected
asexually reproducing plants66 by conferring the rights of inventors to ex
clude others from asexually reproducing protected plants and from using,
offering for sale, selling, or importing any plants so reproduced.67
The Plant Patent Act was a practical solution to the underinvestment in
plant breeding because it gave plant research all of the opportunities avail
able to researchers in other fields.68 It sought to promote private ventures in
plant development that would enrich the public with disease- and drought
resistant varieties of plants.69 In an attempt to meet these goals Congress
stated that the Plant Patent Act:
[I]s intended not only to correct such discrimination, but in doing so it is
hoped the genius of y oung agriculturalists of America will be enlisted in a
profitable work of invention and discovery of new plants that will revolu
tionize agriculture as inventions in steam, electricity, and chemistry have
70

revolutionized those fields and advanced our civilization.

This language suggests that the PPA would use the already organized utility
patent system to promote private research and development into new plant
varieties.71

65. The PPA was codified in Title 35§§ 161-164, was passed on May 13, 1930, and signed
by President Hoover on May 23, 1930. Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Construction and Application
of Plant Patent Act (35 U.S.C.S. §§ 161 et seq.), 135 A.L R FED. 273 (1996).
.

66.

.

35 U.S.C.§ 161 (2004):

Whoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and new variety of plant,
including cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly found seedlings, other than a tuber
propagated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated state, may obtain a patent therefore, sub
ject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
The provisions of this title relating to patents for inventions shall apply to patents for plants,
except as otherwise provided.
This is distinct from the Plant Variety Protection Act (PV PA), 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a) (2000),
where the Department of Agriculture issues certificates to new sexually produced plant varieties as
discussed infra Section LC.
67. 35 U.S.C. § 163 (2000); see Yoder Bros., Inc. v. Cal.-Fla. Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347,
1383 (5th Cir. 1976).
68. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOL
OGY: PATENTING LIFE-SPECIAL REPORT, OAT-BA-370, at 71 (1989).
69.

Id.

70. Jn re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 935 (C. C.P.A. 1962) (quoting H. R . REP. No. 71-1129
(1930)). The Plant Patent Act (35 U.S.C. § 161) was passed as House Bill 11372 of the Second
Session of the 7 lst Congress. Prior to 1930, there existed a common belief that plants, even those
bred by man, were products of nature and therefore not subject matter for patent protection. Woos
ter, supra note 65 at 2, citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 311 (1980). With the passage
of the Plant Patent Act of 1930, Congress attempted to dispel those widely held beliefs to show that
the work of the plant breeder "in aid of nature " should be able to obtain protection. Id. at 312 (quot
ing S. REP. No. 71-315, at 6-8 (1930); H. R. REP. No. 71-1129, at 7-9 (1930)).
71.

OFACE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 68, at 71; Diamond, 447 U.S. at 311-13.
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But since its enactment, plant breeders have had an uneasy relationship
with the utility patent statute's enablement and novelty requirements.72 Sec
tion l.B. l and Section I.B.2 will describe the problems plant inventors face
for meeting the enablement and novelty requirements under the traditional
Patent Act. They will describe the congressional amendments that remedy
the enablement problem but do not touch the novelty issues. Finally, Section
l.B.3 will conclude that the necessary implication gleaned from the congres
sional amendments is that plants should have the same novelty requirements
as widgets.
1. The Enablement Problem
Congress has amended the Patent Act to solve enablement problems.
Plant inventors have a problem with the enablement requirement because a
specification for a plant application cannot be written that meets the disclo
sure requirements of§ 1 12.73 Enablement is important because it represents
the inventor's side of the social contract in exchange for patent rights.74 To
be sufficiently enabling under § 112, an application must disclose to a per
son of ordinary skill in the art how to make and use the patented invention.75
But, for plants, genes are too complex to write on paper, so there is no way
to document and fully describe a plant invention within the four comers of a
page. Even if an inventor knew the entire genetic lineage of her plant, the
genes may combine in a new way on a subsequent sexual reproduction and,
similar to the differences between siblings, two different plants with the
same lineage would thereby result. Practically, the only way to enable a sub
sequent inventor to make the invention is to "clone" the plant through
asexual reproduction such as a cutting or a grafting.76 In other words, a sub
sequent inventor would need to take a cutting of the plant and grow that
72. See Peter J. Goss, Comment, Guiding the Hand That Feeds: Toward Socially Optimal
Appropriability in Agricultural Biotechnology Innovation, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1395 (1996).
73.

35 u.s.c§ 112 (2004):

The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make
and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying
out his invention. The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Section

112

thus requires that the patent specification describe the invention in sufficient detail

to: (I) enable a subsequent inventor to make the invention,

(2) provide

the best mode of making and

using the invention, and (3) provide a written description that shows the invention was in possession
of the inventor at the time of filing the patent.

74. MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 33-45 (1984 &
2001) (citing Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights
and Experimental Use, 56 U. Cm. L. R. 1017 (1989)); see also Suzanne Scotchmer & Jerry Green,
Novelty and Disclosure in Patent !Aw, 21 RAND J. EcoN. 131 (1990).
Supp.

75.

35 U.S.C.§ 112 (2004).

76.

COOPERATIVE EXTENSION, COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE, UNIV. OF ARIZONA, ARIZONA

MASTER GARDENER MANUAL
propagation/asexual.html.

17-23 (1998), available at

http://ag.arizona.edu/pubs/garden/mg/
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cutting into a mature plant in order to fully make and use the patented inven
tion.77 Therefore, a specification for a plant application can never meet the
enablement requirement of§ 11 2.
Congress amended the PPA to correct for problems of enablement. The
requirements of a utility patent were amended to add the express provision
that botanical descriptions are enabling if they are "as complete as reasona
bly possible" and in accordance with traditional botanical descriptions.78
But, Congress made no accommodations for plants that struggled with the
novelty requirement. These novelty problems are exactly those at issue in
Elsner.

79

2. The Novelty Problem
The novelty problem for plants means that even the best plant disclosure
will not be sufficiently enabling to preclude novelty for a subsequent inven
tion; Congress has failed to correct this problem. Looking to the patent
application process best explains this difficulty. To determine novelty, the
patent examiner compares a piece of prior art that fits within the time and
type limitations80 to the disclosures in the patent application.81 He deter
mines whether the prior art is enabling, meaning it sufficiently describes the
invention as to preclude a finding of novelty. Generally, a prior publication
is not enabling unless it contains and exhibits:
a substantial representation of the patented improvement, in such full,
clear, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art or science
to which it appertains, to make, construct, and practice the invention to the
same practical extent as they would be enabled to do if the information
82
was derived from a prior patent.

Similar to the enablement problem, plant references cannot meet this
novelty model because one cannot sufficiently disclose all of the genetic
limitations on paper in order to preclude novelty for a subsequent invention.
As was the issue in Elsner, this problem is most prevalent with inventions
that are used and described abroad because the territorial distinctions on
§ 1 02 restrict the patent office to only looking at foreign printed material.83
This novelty disclosure problem is a mirror image of the aforementioned
enablement disclosure problem.

77.

Id.

78.

35 U.S.C. § 162 (2004); S. REP. No. 71-315 (1930).

79.

In re Elsner, 381F.3d1125 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

80.

HovEY, supra note 33, at 138-39.

81.

Id.

82. Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 516, 555 (1870). Note that while a reference must be en
abled to anticipate a patent and this analysis of this enablement is similar to that required in § 112,
§ 112 only codifies the enablement requirements for patent applications, not the enablement re
quirements for anticipatory references.
83.

See supra Section I.A; supra notes 34-37.
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Even though the novelty and enablement ideas go hand in hand, when
adding language to the PPA to correct the enablement problem at the disclo
4
5
sure stage,8 Congress failed to correct at the novelty stage.8 Moreover, a
bill proposed in Congress after Elsner that would alter the prior art stan
dards for plants has failed to get much attention.86
3. The Necessary Implication

It is unlikely that the lack of disclosure amendment at the novelty stage
was congressional oversight because the ideas of enablement and novelty
are so interwoven. From a policy standpoint, the disclosure requirement en
sures that each patent application is enabling for future inventors,87 the effect
of this requirement is to put the public on notice of the invention such that it
is no longer novel. For instance, one can imagine how under a system with a
less strict§ 1 12 enablement requirement, one could patent a widget and sub
sequent "inventors" could also patent the same widget because the first
patent, by it terms, did not fully disclose the invention as to bar novelty for
the subsequent "inventors." Thus, courts should interpret congressional si
lence for novelty when these ideas are so closely related to mean that
Congress did not haphazardly miss this change, but instead intended for the
enablement-novelty requirement to stay the same for plants and utility pat
ents.
Further, Congress has amended the Plant Patent Act many times without
addressing the enablement problem of § 102.88 Even after Elsner the most
recent proposal to amend § 162 has attracted little attention.89 Therefore,
since Congress makes an exception in § 162 for treating plants differently

84.

See supra text accompanying notes 73-78.

85.

Compare 35 U.S.C.§ 1 62 (amending 35 U.S.C.§ 1 1 2), with 35 U.S.C.§ 1 02.

86. Plant Breeder's Equity Act of 2005, H.R. 1 2 1 , 1 09th Cong. (2005). Representative Dar
rell E. Issa introduced this bill on Jan. 4, 2005. As of September 1 8, 2005, this bill had attracted no
major congressional action and no co-sponsors. See Thomas: Legislative Information on the Inter
net, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl09:h.r. 00 1 2 1 : (last visited Sep. 1 8, 2 005).
87. Festa Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736 (2002)
("[P]atent rights are given in exchange for disclosing the invention to the public. "); J.E.M. AG Sup
ply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'/, 534 U.S. 1 24, 142 (200 1 ) ("The disclosure required by the Patent
Act is the quid pro quo of the right to exclude. ") (citations omitted); Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K.
Tangri, Ending Patent Law's Willfulness Game, 18 BERKELEY TucH. L.J. 1085, 1 101 (2003); see,
e.g. , Donald S. Chisum, Anticipation, Enablement, Obviousness: An Eternal Golden Braid, 1 5
AIPLA Q.J. 57 ( 1 987) (disclosure is " a primary purpose " o f the enablement requirement).
88. As originally enacted, the Plant Patent Act of 1930 was a series of amendments to the
general utility patent law. Most prominently, section 4886 of the Revised Statutes was amended to
read that "[a]ny person who has invented or discovered any new and useful art, machine . . . or who
has invented or discovered and asexually reproduced any distinct and new variety of plant . . . may
. . . obtain a patent therefore. " Rev. Stat.§ 4886 ( 19988), amended by Act of May 23, 1930, ch. 312,
§I, 46 Stat. 376 (current version split at 35 U.S.C. §§ IOI, 1 6 1 ). In 1954 the Plant Patent Act was
amended to preclude patent protection for plants in an uncultivated state again without mentioning
the special plant novelty issues. Act of Sept. 3, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-775, 68 Stat. 1 1 90.
89.

See supra note 86.
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90
with regard to the written description requirement of § 112 but makes no
mention of the comparable § 102, the same law should be used for utility
91
patents as those for plants. This is especially true in light of the affirma
9
tions that § 161 "engrafts the Plant Patent Act onto the basic patent law." 2
Further evidence that Congress intended § 102 to apply indiscriminately to
plants as well as widgets is found by looking to the Plant Variety Protection
Act.
C. The Plant Variety Protection Act
Congress says explicitly when to apply disparate treatment to different
inventions; since Congress did not explicitly categorize asexually reproduc
ing plants, then no disparate treatment should apply. An example of a
statutorily created disparate treatment regime is the 1970 Plant Variety Pro
9
tection Act ("PVPA"). 3 With the PVPA, Congress distinguished sexually
reproducing plants from asexually reproducing ones and placed each in dif
9
ferent categories. 4 The PVPA then set forth specific rules for sexually
9
reproducing plants and did not allow them to be patentable under the PPA. 5
This disparate treatment was necessary because the only inventions pat
entable under Plant Patent Act were ones where the inventor met the social
contract for full patent protection-sexually reproducing plants could not
9
meet it. 6
The creation of the discriminatory scheme for sexually reproducing
plants illustrates that when Congress intends discrimination against certain
inventions, it speaks explicitly to the type of invention and to the different

90. In re LeGrice, 30 1 F.2d 929 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (noting that § 1 62 allows a plant patent
owner to have an insufficient written description and still fulfill the enablement requirement).
9 1 . This idea has also caught the courts and is developed further in LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929
(C.C.P.A. 1962).
92. Le Grice, 30 1 F.2d at 933. In 1 952, Congress created a separate chapter of law, chapter
1 62, to address plant patent law but affirmed that plants be treated under the utility patent statute.
Wooster, supra note 65 at § 2. Although the 1 952 amendment placed Plant Patents in a separate
chapter from utility patents, § 1 6 1 maintained that "provisions of this title relating to patent for
inventions shall apply to patents for plants, except as otherwise provided." Wooster, supra note 65 at
2; 35 U.S.C. § 1 6 1 (2 004) (emphasis added).
93. The Plant Variety Protection Act of 1 970 42, 84 Stat. 1 542, amended by 1 994 Amend
ments, Pub. L. No. 1 03-349, 3, 1 08 Stat. 3 1 38, 7 U.S.C. 2402(a) (2002).
94. Elisa Rives, Comment, Mother Nature and the Courts: Are Sexually Reproducing Plants
and their Progeny Patentable under the Utility Patent Act of 1952?, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 1 87, 222-23
(2001 --02).
95. The Plant Variety Protection Act of 1 970 42, 84 Stat. 1 542, amended by 1 994 Amend
ments, Pub. L. No. 1 03-349, 3, 1 08 Stat. 3 1 38, 7 U.S.C. 2402(a) (2002).
96. Sexually reproducing plants are unable to meet the enablement requirements under the
general Patent Act. Rives, supra note 94, at 222-23. Unlike microorganisms or asexually reproduc
ing plants, sexually reproducing plants cannot meet the enablement requirement even with a deposit
of the organism because sexually reproduced plants cannot be reproduced from the deposit beyond
one generation. Id.
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methods of treatment. 97 As such, the PVPA is a scheme for treating these
plant inventions differently because they provide different public benefits. 98
Since Congress did not set up any similar intellectual property scheme for
asexually reproducing plants but instead engrafted it onto the existing patent
law,99 there should be no discrimination between these plants and other pat
entable inventions.
IL

J UDICIAL A CTIONS

This Part argues that judicial interpretation of the Patent Act favors a
"possession test" interpretation over an interpretation that limits Elsner to
plants. Section II. A will show that prior interpretations of the Patent Act's
"printed publication" clause sought to avoid different standards for different
technology. Interpretations of the "printed publication" clause instead
adopted a flexible test similar to Eisner's "possession test." Section II. A
discusses how courts have anticipated patents by combining pieces of prior
art; it shows that Eisner 's combination of a publication and sale to preclude
novelty is not a groundbreaking approach. Section II.B will show that courts
have interpreted the goals of the Plant Patent Act in a way that rejects any
readings that require different standards for plants. Section II.C will then
argue that the parallels between plants and microorganisms necessarily im
ply that creating a standard unique to plants would be illogical. Finally,
Section II. C argues that earlier judicial decisions have favored modifying a
general rule to fit the new inventions over applying differing standards to the
new inventions.
A. Prior Interpretations of the Patent Act A re Flexible
The courts have interpreted other sections of the Patent Act to apply a
"possession test" similar to that of Elsner. Section II.A l will show that the
meaning of "printed publication" has changed to one that considers the de
gree of accessibility to and dissemination of an invention instead of
delineating certain categories of technologies that create printed publica-

97.
Under the PVPA, plant breeders are issued a certificate of protection for novel and dis
tinct varieties that breed "true-to-type " through sexual reproduction-a requirement that is more
restrictive than the PPA's novelty requirement. Jeremy P. Oczek, Note, In the Aftermath of the "Ter
minator" Technology Controversy: Intellectual P roperty P rotections for Genetically Engineered
Seeds and the Right to Save and Replant Seed, 41 B.C. L. REv. 627, 637-38 (2000). Also, certifi
cates under PVPA are not administered under the United States Patent and Trademark Office, but are
issued under the Department of Agriculture. The Plant Variety Protection Act of 1 970 42, 84 Stat.
1 542, amended by 1 994 Amendments, Pub. L. No. 103-349, 3, 108 Stat. 3 1 38, 7 U.S.C. 2321
(2000).
For instance, Oczek notes that "[t]he original rationale for restricting patent protection to
98.
asexually reproduced plants under the PPA was the belief that new plant varieties could not be re
produced reliably by seed. " Oczek, supra note 97, at 537. The PVPA further has two significant
limitations: the 'research exemption' and the 'crop exemption.' " Id. at 638.
99.
35 U.S.C. § 1 6 1 (2000) ("The provisions of [Title 35] relating to patents for inventions
shall apply to patents for plants, except as otherwise provided. "); In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 933
(C.C.P.A. 1 962).
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tions from those that do not.'00 Section II.A.2 will discuss how the preemp
tive categories of § 102 are not always interpreted as independent, and
instead courts have combined the categories, making the category combina
tion in Elsner unoriginal in this sense.
1. Printed Publication Interpretation
Courts no longer interpret the language of the Patent Act according to
the framers' narrow definition. For instance, the meaning of "printed publi
cation" under §§ 1 02(a) and (b)1 01 has branched out to include acts that the
1952 Congress never could have contemplated: soft copy documents, for
example.102 Similar to Elsner, this expansion has taken place because the
courts have needed to adapt the "printed publication" bar to the changing
methods of printing or copying. In fact, parallel to the Elsner test, the mean
ing of printed publication in § 102(b) is now based on a test of public
accessibility instead of adhering to the historic language from 1 623.w3
Although courts originally found their description of "printed publica
tion" broad, those definitions would be considered very narrow when
compared to today's interpretation of the statutory language. For instance,
courts originally restricted the meaning of "printed publication" in§ 102 to
the products of outdated movable type processes.'04 In 1 97 1, Phillips Elec
tronic & Pharmaceutical Industries Corp. v. Thermal & Electronics
5
Industries, Inc. ' 0 applied this same language to invalidate a patent for elec
trical tubes in light of a microfilmed copy of an anticipatory patent
application.1 06 The court stated that a restriction of the interpretation of the
"printed" requirement of§ 102 solely to the products of a traditional print
ing press would "ignore the realities of the scientific and technological
period in which we live and the underlying rationale of Section 1 02."w7 In
direct conflict with the age-old movable-type definition, the court ruled that
1 00. This argument about printed publications is separate from the argument that the Con
gress intended reinterpretation of the Patent Act because the judicial reinterpretation of "printed
publication " has not spurred congressional action. See supra Section I.A.
1 0 1 . 35 U.S.C. § § 1 02 (a)-(b) (2000) deny a patent to any or part of any invention described
in a printed publication before the invention or more than one year prior to the date of the patent
application.
102. For instance, although it did not invalidate the patent, the Northern District of Illinois
recently considered the "Newspace Electronic Newspaper " as prior art for Amazon's U.S. Patent
No. 5,754,939 (filed Oct. 3 1 , 1 995). See Pinpoint Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 03 C 4954, 2004
WL 20330'.:9, at *6 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
103. "The phrase 'described in a printed publication' dates at least to the Patent Act of 1 623,
Statute 2 1 Jae. I, Ch 3, § 6 which used the phrase 'described in some public work.' " Kobylak, supra
note 46, at § 2, citing Evans v. Eaton, 1 6 U.S. 454 ( 1 8 1 8). The term "public work " was dropped in
favor of "printed publication " in the Patent Act of 1 870; this wording has been retained through the
present Patent Act of 1 952, 35 U.S.C. § 102. Kobylak, supra note 46, at § 2 .
104.

See Gulliksen v. Halburg, 75 U.S.P.Q. 252 (C.C.P.A. 1 937).

105.

450 F.2d 1 1 64 (3d Cir. 1 97 1 ) .

1 06.

Phillips E/ec. , 450 F.2d 1 164 (3d Cir. 1 97 1 ).

107.

Id. at 1 1 70.
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the term "printed" can include documents duplicated by modem methods
and techniques as long as the documents are rendered available to the pub!. 108
IC.

One can imagine these cases taking a different route where only "printed
publications" created by a specific technology, for instance a printing press,
would be barring under§ 102. This route would be comparable to a reading
of Elsner that varies novelty for certain technologies-such as, in this case,
plants. But instead, similar to the "public accessibility" reading of Elsner,
the printed publication decisions dealt with changing technology by finding
that the publication bar relates broadly to public accessibility and degree of
dissemination regardless of the technology in question.
2. Single Prior A rt Reference Rule

Not only have the courts failed to adhere to the framers' narrow defini
tions of the§ 102 language, but they have also failed to adhere to the "single
prior art reference" rule for prior art. Generally, finding an invention invalid
for lack of novelty under§ 102 requires that all elements of the invention be
09
disclosed in some other single prior art reference or device.1 But, the Fed
eral Circuit has allowed the use of extrinsic evidence to enable a prior art
reference and therefore has combined two references to anticipate a patent.
1
For example, in In re Samour1 0 the court used two references to hold the
patent invalid. The court held a patent invalid for lack of novelty in light of
an original reference which disclosed the name and structural formula for a
chemical111 and a second reference that showed a method of preparing the
compound.112 Many cases then followed the In re Samour approach of com
1
bining references to enable a primary disclosure. 13

1 08.

Phillips Elec., 450 F.2d 1 164 (3d Cir. 1 97 1 ).

1 09. For instance, i f you claim A, B , and C in your patent, then the only document or widget
that can bar your novelty would be one that contains all of the elements: A, B and C. Kenneth R.
Walton, The Use of Evidence Extrinsic to a Single Source to Support Anticipation, 20 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 339 ( 1 994); see Kal man V. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 7 1 3 F.2d 760, 77 1 (Fed.
Cir. 1 983), cen. denied, 465 U.S. 1026 ( 1 984).
1 1 0.

In re Samour, 5 7 1 F.2d 559 (C.C.P.A. 1 978).

1 1 1 . The mere publication of the chemical name and formula did not show that the compound
was in the possession of the public before the § l 02(b) one year bar. Thus, to enable the compound,
the court used a second reference that showed a method of preparing the compound for a chemist of
ordinary skill. Walton, supra note I 09 at 361-62; see Samour, 57 1 F.2d 559.
1 1 2.

Walton, supra note 1 09 ; see Samour, 57 1 F.2d 559.

1 1 3. In re Sasse followed this approach and invalidated a patent, in facts similar to Samour,
by using a secondary reference that taught how to make the chemical compound to enable the pri
mary reference that gave only the name and elements of the compound. In re Sasse, 629 F.2d 675
(C.C.P.A. 1 980); Walton, supra note I 09 at 362-63. In Donohue the printed publication contained
an abstract disclosing the chemical compound but the text did not disclose any preparative details,
properties, or other test data. The court nonetheless found that the printed publication taken together
with references that taught general preparatory methods, taught a person of ordinary skill in the art
to make and use the invention and thus put the public in possession of the invention. Donohue, 632
F.2d 1 23 (C.C.P.A. 1 980); Walton, supra note 1 09, at 363-64.
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Reference combination is also not limited to domestic sources. A bbott
used a reference combination to meet the
115
§ 102(b) Pfaff v. Wells Electronics test. The court determined that the in
vention met the Pfaff test and was ready for patenting by considering
whether foreign manufacturers had reduced the subject matter to practice
material not even within the§ 102(b) domestic bar.116
Labs v. Geneva Pharma, Inc.114

Eisner's possession test follows this lineage of cases by stating that a
novelty analysis should not tum on whether the prior art specifically meets
the§ 102 categories, but only on whether it enables one to access the inven
tion. The court stated that "the precise focus of the analysis is not whether
the foreign sales are themselves§ 102(b) prior art, but whether the publica
tion has placed the claimed invention in the possession of the public before
the critical date."1 17 Elsner specifically relies upon In re Donohue and
Samour to support its expanded test even though neither case involved
plants.118 One can conclude from these cases that, analogous to a reading of
Elsner as a possession test, following the single reference rule is not neces
sary so long as a combination puts the public in possession of the invention
and one reference contains all of the elements.

B. Nondiscrimination Is a Paramount Concern: In re LeGrice
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has previously read the
Plant Patent Act to mean that plant nondiscrimination is more important
than maintaining the current state of the Patent Act. 119 Similar to Elsner, In
1 0
re LeGrice 2 interpreted the Patent Act and its unique application to plants.
The issue on appeal was whether publications that disclosed as much about
plants as possible but did not describe the entire invention would preempt a
1 1
patent. 2 In deciding that they did not preempt, the Court of Appeals found
many persuasive reasons in the legislative history to maintain that non
discrimination for plants was important.

1 14. The court rejected a drug patent to Abbott Labs because it was the subject matter of at
least three commercial sales in the United States before the critical date. The court stated that "it is
also clear that the invention was 'ready for patenting' because at least two foreign manufacturers had
already reduced it to practice. " Abbott Labs. v. Geneva Pharm Inc 1 82 F.3d 1 31 5 , 1 31 8 (Fed. Cir.
1 999).
.•

. •

1 1 5. Pfajf v. Wells Elec., Inc. , 525 U.S. 55 ( 1 998) (creating a two-part test for the on-sale bar
that the invention be ( 1) subject to a commercial offer for sale before the critical date and (2) ready
for patenting before the critical date).
1 1 6.

35 U.S.C. § 102(b) ("in this country ").

1 17.

In re Elsner, 3 8 1 F.3d 1 1 25, 1 1 29-30 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

1 1 8. Elsner; 38 1 F.3d at 1 129, cites Donohue, 766 F.2d 559 (C.C.P.A. 1978), and Samour, 57 1
F.2d 559 (C.C.P.A. 1978), to show that combining references is not unique. For a discussion of
Donohue reference combination, see supra note 1 1 3.
1 1 9.

In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929 (C.C.P.A. 1962).

1 20.

Id.

121.

See the discussion of enablement problems, supra Section LB. I .
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First, as LeGrice found, the legislative history of the Plant Patent Act
was very explicit that plant nondiscrimination is more important than main
taining the current state of the Patent Act. As the legislative history revealed,
the purpose of the PPA was to
afford agriculture, so far as practicable, the same opportunity to participate
in the benefits of the patent system as has been given industry and thus as
sist in placing agriculture on a basis of economic equality with industry.
The bill will remove the existing discrimination between plant developers
and industrial inventors . .

.

. 122

Even beyond providing equal opportunity, Congress enacted the PPA to
1
motivate young horticulturalists. 23 Thus, Congress stated that the PPA
will afford a sound basis for investing capital in plant breeding and conse
quently stimulate plant development through private funds . . .. [Because]
[n]o one has advanced a just and logical reason why reward for service to
the public should be extended to the inventor of a mechanical toy and de
nied to the genius whose patience, foresight, and effort have given a
valuable new variety of fruit or other plant to mankind.

124

Then, speaking to the language of the PPA, LeGrice concluded that
"Congress did not provide any exception thereto, so it should be presumed
that Congress intended that it should be applied to patents for plants as it
2
had been previously applied to patents for other inventions." 1 5
Applying Elsner narrowly to plants alone undermines the LeGrice re
quirement that prior art for plants patents meet the same requirements as any
126
other printed publications. The Elsner court found that a foreign sale cou
pled with a foreign disclosure puts the public in possession of the invention
for plants even though it would not preclude novelty for widget inven
27
tions.1
The LeGrice court held that "plant descriptions in printed
publications of new plant varieties, before they may be used as statutory
bars under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), must meet the same standards which must be
met before a description in a printed publication becomes a bar in non-plant
18
patent cases." 2 In support of this holding, LeGrice went back to the idea of

1 22. LeGrice, 301 F.2d at 932 ("35 U.S.C. § 1 6 1 is based on an amendment, effective May
23, 1 930, to R.S. 4886, (Sec. 3 1 of former title 35 U.S.C.), which originated in House Bill 1 1 372 of
the Second Session of the 71 st Congress. "). The Committee on Patents filed a report with the lan
guage quoted supra, text accompanying notes 1 22 and 1 24. Identical language was filed in a report
by the Senate Committee of Patents. LeGrice, 301 F.2d at 932.
123.

LeGrice, 30 1 F.2d at 932.

1 24.

Id.

1 25 .

Id. at 933.

1 26. The test in LeGrice merely "require[d] that the facts of each case be carefully considered
to determine whether the description in the printed publication in question [did] in fact place the
invention in the possession of the public. " Id. at 939.
1 27 .

In re Elsner, 3 8 1 F.3d 1 1 25 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

1 28 .

LeGrice, 30 1 F.2d a t 944.
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public possession as the basis for novelty.1 29 Thus, as LeGrice noted, a pub
lic possession-based test would have the same requirements for plants as
widgets. A narrow reading of Elsner that only applies it to plants would thus
undermine the controlling LeGrice.
C. Plants A re Not Especially Unique: In re Argoudelis
Elsner cannot easily be restricted to plants because the disclosure diffi
culties of plants are also present in microorganisms, thus fracturing any
distinction that one can hope to draw between plants and other patentable
inventions. In re A rgoudelis involved a patent for a microorganism that was
rejected for § 1 1 2 enablement problems despite being deposited in a public
deposit.1 30 The court was asked how microorganism inventors could meet the
§ 1 1 2 enablement requirement. 1 3 1 Two interesting things can be gleaned
from the Argoudelis decision. First, A rgoudelis shows the similarities be
tween asexual plants and microorganisms make the treatment of plants as
unique illogical. Second, the A rgoudelis court faced the choice between cre
ating an exception to the Patent Act or adapting the statutory requirements;
they chose the latter. This is the same decision the Elsner court was faced
with, though the Elsner court chose to create a novelty exception unique to
plants.1 32
First, Argoudelis shows that a problem with the application of the Elsner
test strictly to plants is that the enablement problem of plants patentable
under§ 1 6 1 extends to things that can be patented under§ 1 0 1 . Noting the
similarities between plants and other organisms, Elsner related its reasoning
133
to Argoudelis. The court in A rgoudelis rejected the inventor's argument
134
that because there are similar enablement problems for plants and micro
organisms, microorganisms should benefit from the relaxed enablement
requirement that plants have under the Plant Patent Act.1 35 While the court
rejected using§ 1 6 1 for enablement, they did note that similar problems for

1 29. Id. at 939 ("Each case must be decided on its own particular facts in determining
whether, in fact, the description in the printed publication is adequate to put the public in possession
of the invention and thus bar patentability of a plant under the condition stated in sectionI 02(b).").
1 30.

In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390 (C.C.P.A. 1970).

1 3 1.

Id.

132.

Jn re Elsner, 381 F.3d 1 125 (Fed. Cir. 2 004).

1 33. Id. at 1 1 3 1 ("It is important to note that it was not mere possession of the microorganism
that was i mportant in Argoudelis, but such possession that enabled one of ordinary skill to make the
claimed invention. Similarly here. Just as the public had access to the microorganism in Argoudelis,
so too might the public have had access through the foreign sales to the plant varieties that Elsner
and Zary claim.").
134. As discussed supra Section l.B.l , an enablement problem arises when an inventor cannot
fully describe the inventions to the point that others could read the patent application and then make
and use the i nvention. This problem arises for plants as well as organisms because scientists are
currently unable to reconstruct such beings from a description, even a DNA sequence that is written
on a page.
1 35.

Argoudelis, 434 F.2d at 1392.
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plants and microorganisms exist,13 6 and they found that the deposit require.
.
131
enablement.i3 s s·mce asexual
ment was suffi1c1ent �ior the m1croorgamsm
.
reproduction occurs and no other meaningful differences exist between the
plants of Elsner and the microorganisms of A rgoudelsis, applying the Elsner
decision only to plants would draw an arbitrary Iine.13 9 Therefore, a con
strained plant-limited reading of the Elsner decision illogically distinguishes
between plants and organisms with similar traits, while the broader "posses
sion test" reading would apply it to all inventions based on the facts of each
case.
Second, the judiciary had formerly applied the Patent Act to non
traditional inventions by adapting the statutory requirements of the general
rules of the Patent Act to meet those inventions, not by creating exceptions
for certain inventions under the Patent Act.140 The microorganism in A r
goudelsis did not meet the statutory requirements because the public could
not access the deposit until after the patent issued. 141 The organizations that
filed amici urged the court to modify the Patent Act and create a second ex
ception for microorganism-type inventions that would match that of asexual
plants.142 The court stated that its "task here is not to decide what the general
rule should be or to create exceptions to the provisions of§ 112, but rather
to interpret and apply § 112 to the facts of the case before [it]." 143 The court
created deposit requirements for microorganisms that cannot be described
and shown on the application and cannot otherwise meet the enablement
standard. 144 Similarly, if the Elsner court wanted to avoid disparate treat
ment, especially since Congress did not call for it in the statute, then its
§ 1 02 modification and test of possession must be applied to all utility ob
jects.
III . I NTERNATIONAL LAW

This Part argues that, consistent with Elsner, U.S. courts should strive to
harmonize U.S. patent standards with international intellectual property law.
Section III .A will discuss the importance of international cooperation to1 36. Id. at 1 392 ("[A] unique aspect of using microorganisms as starting materials is that a
sufficient description of how to obtain the microorganism from nature cannot be given. ").
1 37. The deposit requirement says that inventors must deposit some of their novel material
into a public depository available to all inventors if they are otherwise unable meet the enablement
requirements. Note that the PPA exempts plants from this requirement.
1 38.

Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1 390 (C.C.P.A. 1 970).

1 39.

In re Elsner, 381 F.3d 1 1 25 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

140.

Argoudelis, 434 F.2d at 1 392.

141.

Id. at 1 392.

142. Id. ("It has been pointed out in the Amicus Curiae brief that the same predicament exists
in the case of asexually reproduced plants. In regard to plants, a general dispensation from the re
quirements of § 1 1 2 has been accorded by 35 U.S.C. 1 62 . It is urged that the same should be true
tiere. ")
143.

Id.

1 44.

Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1 390 (C.C.P.A. 1 970).
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ward the harmonization of intellectual property law and will argue that
when looking for guidance on where intellectual property law is moving,
courts should look to international bodies as well as Congress. Section III.B
will then discuss the studies of the World Intellectual Property Organization
("WIPO") and why their research should persuade U.S. courts to harmonize
treatment of international sales.
A. Hannonization Occurs in Response
to lnfonnation Accessibility

Not only is harmonization of laws a common theme in intellectual prop
erty, but often what motivates such harmonization is the increased access to
foreign goods and information-similar to increased access of foreign-sold
goods at issue in Elsner. In patent law, the United States remains the only
1
5
country using the outdated local novelty 14 standard. 46 But, the U.S. interna
tional representatives have committed to harmonizing its novelty
requirements. Following the Patent Law Treaty negotiations in 2000, the
U.S. representative for the WIPO Standing Committee on the Law of Pat
ents agreed to move forward with harmonization efforts by signing an
agreement to define prior art as having no geographical limitations. 147 Be
cause this recommendation comes as a response to increased access to
foreign information and products, a court considering novelty should con
sider the WIPO representative's goals of harmonization when formulating
the modem novelty standard.
Similar to how the novelty standard should change as people are increas
ingly able to access products sold abroad, the change for well-known
trademarks was sparked as people began to move around the globe and ac
cess, and thus be confused by, well-known marks. Trademark law moved
toward harmonization when transportation technology allowed people to
145. Local novelty describes a scheme where distinctions are made between domestic and
international prior art. STANDING COMM. ON THE LAW OF PATENTS, WORLD INTEL. PROP. ORG.,
INFORMATION PROVIDED BY MEMBERS OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS
(SCP) CONCERNING THE DEFINITION OF PRIOR ART, SCP/6/INF/2, para. 6, (200 1 ) available at
http://www.wipo.int/scp/en/documents/session_6/pdf/scp6_inf2.pdf (finding summary of responses
found only one country that still has a territorial distinction for prior art); see Kate H. Murashige,
Harmonization of Patent Laws, 1 5 Hous. J. INT'L L. 5 9 1 , 610 ( 1 994).
146. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1 883, 2 1 U.S.T.
1 583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, amended July 14, 1967 [hereinafter "Paris Convention"], 2 1 U.S.T. 1 583,
828 U.N.T.S. 302 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. Speaking specifically to § 1 02, originally Australia
and the United States both had a form of local novelty. But Australia has now moved to a system
without such territorial distinctions-leaving the U.S. laws as the only ones still using of this re
gime. Symposium, Cavalieri Hilton; 6th Open Forum; "Roundtable," IO U. BALT. INTELL. PROP.
L.J. 1 5 1 , 1 62 (2002) (statement of Vivienne Thom).
147.
STANDING COMM. ON THE LAW OF PATENTS, WORLD INTEL. PROP. 0RG., DRAFT SUB
STANTIVE PATENT LAW TREATY, (2004), art. 8, para. 1 ("The prior art with respect to a claimed
invention shall consist of all information which has been made available to the public anywhere in
the world in any form [,as prescribed in the Regulations,] before the priority date of the claimed
invention."), available at http://www.wipo.int/scp/en/documents/session_ l O/pdf/scp 1 O_4.pdf;
Margo A. Bagley, Patently Unconstitutional: The Geographical Limitation on Prior Art in a Small
World, 87 MINN. L. REV. 679 (2003).
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move further and faster, and thus made the world a figuratively smaller
place. Before 1883, there was a strict rule of territoriality, meaning that if a
trademark was not registered in an individual nation then it was not pro
tected in that nation.1 48 But as traveling between borders became more
common, treaties began to harmonize domestic laws in order to protect
marks globally. The Paris Convention maintained the same principal of terri
toriality,149 but also gave rights to "well known marks"--even over rights of
domestic filers.150 In the mid-1990s, the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec
tual Property Rights ("TRIPs")151 treaty further strengthened this
commitment to the "well-known marks" protection.152 The Drafters added
the "well-known marks" clause because as people were increasingly able to
travel across borders, they would be confused if well-known marks were not
3
uniform. 15 The strengthening of protection for well-known marks shows
how trademark law has changed in response to the public's ability to access
international information.
Similarly, just as the accessibility of works sparked harmonization in
copyright law,154 when a court recognizes that increased access to goods
threatens the novelty standard, it should consider the harmonization efforts
of the U.S. representatives that seek to maintain a constant level of protec
tion. The system of copyright was harmonized in order to respond to a
changed technological reality. An international system for copyright law
began in 1886 with the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works. 155 Although the Berne Convention set standards for interna-

148. SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 35. In 1883, the Paris Convention governed interna
tional IP rights. Paris Convention, supra note 146.
149.

Paris Convention, supra note 146, art. 6(3).

150. Paris Convention, supra note 146, art. 6bis ("The countries of the Union undertake, ex
officio if their legislation so permits, or at the request of an interested party, to refuse or to cancel
the registration, and to prohibit the use, of a trademark which constitutes a reproduction, an imita
tion, or a translation, liable to create confusion, of a mark considered by the competent authority of
the country of registration or use to be well known in that country as being already the mark of a
person entitled to the benefits of this Convention and used for identical or similar goods.").
151. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay
Round): Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in
Counterfeit Goods, 33 1.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement].
152. See TRWs Agreement, supra note 156, art. 16, available at http://www.wto.org/english/
docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf.
153.

Paris Convention, supra note 146,

art.

6bis; see TRIPs Agreement supra note 151.

154. See Steven Chase, Napster Clone May Set Up Shop Offshore, TORONTO GLOB E & MAI L,
Mar. 5, 200
I, at A I (showing the risk of copyright violations when different countries have different
copyright standards and information is easily accessed).
155. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24, 1971
1161 U.N.T.S. 3. [hereinafter Berne Convention]. When the Berne Convention was developed, sev
eral European countries had significant differences in their laws. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The
Development and Incorporation of International Norms in the Formation of Copyright Law, 62
OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 737 (2001) (citing SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTEC
TION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986, at 8-17 (1987)). The Berne Convention
required nations to treat foreign applicants the same as their own nationals and set a series of mini
mum standards of protection. See Berne Convention, supra. Members agree to a nation's addition to
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tional law, it was relatively lax about allowing member states to retain dif
5
ferent copyright regimes.1 6 Moreover, despite the relaxed standards, the
United States did not harmonize its standards with many of the international
1
copyright law standards until computers posed threats to copyright law. 57
Suddenly, "the ease with which works [could] be digitally reproduced, and
digitally delivered to any location in the world, [meant] that international
protection [was] required by producers merely to sustain their domestic
market."158 When the threat of access to digitized works became realistic, the
United States used the trade mechanisms of the G ATI Uruguay Round to
60
harmonize both the copyright rules159 and enforcement mechanisms.1
In light of the harmonization efforts that take place when global infor
mation becomes more accessible, a court should look to international
sources as a basis for informing decisions in areas where Congress is silent.
Not only is the novelty standard threatened by the increased access to for
eign sales, but the U.S. WIPO representative has spoken about the intent of
the United States to harmonize U.S. with foreign laws. Thus, a broad inter
pretation of Elsner is consistent with international trends in intellectual
property and follows the recommendations of the U.S. WIPO representative.
B. WIPO Is Uniquely Situated to Make Good Decisions
In a recent proposal to WIPO from the United States, Japan, and the
European Patent Office, the benefits of prior art were discussed and the re
port stated that not only is harmonization on novelty issues on the horizon
but it offers "consistent examination standards throughout the world, im
prove[d] patent quality, and reduce[d] the duplication of work performed by
Berne once domestic practices are sufficiently harmonized; the Convention also provides a floor of
minimum compliance for the member states. See id.
1 56.
While copyright law harmonization did occur under the Berne Convention, it is i mpor
tant to note that member countries still have substantial freedom to tailor the minimum standards to
meet their culture. Dinwoodie, supra note 155, at 740-4 1 . This means that as long as each of the
members is offered similar treatment, countries are free to offer those rights in ways sensitive to
their individual cultures. Id.
1 57. This is not to say the United States did not make any changes in order to accede to the
Berne Convention. The 1 976 Copyright Act, for instance, eliminated the copyright term based on
date of publication, moving the United States toward harmonization. William Belanger, U.S. Com
pliance with the Berne Convention, 3 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 373 ( 1 995). The United States
then adopted the Berne Convention Implementation Act ("BCIA ") to harmonize U.S. formalities
such as registration and deposit requirements. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1 988, Pub.
L. No. 1 00-568, 1 02 Stat. 2853. The BClA was an attempt to meet only the minimum standards for
Berne.
1 58.

Dinwoodie, supra note 1 55, at 745.

1 59. The tightening of the standards occurred in many stages. See, e.g., Visual Artists Rights
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 1 0 1 -650, 1 04 Stat. 5089, 5 1 28-33 (codified as amended in scattered sec
tions of 1 7 U.S.C.); Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 1 1 2 Stat. 2860 ( 1 998)
(codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); TRlPs Agreement, supra note 1 5 1 ; Dinwoodie, supra
note 1 55 , at 744-45 (providing an account of the changes to international copyright law).
1 60. International copyright standards were placed within the purview of the WTO Dispute
settlement system for enforcement. TRlPs Agreement, supra note 1 5 1 , annex 2, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu.pdf; Dinwoodie, supra note 1 55 , at 746.
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patent offices."1 61 Courts should consider this statement because, while
WIPO's recommendations are not binding on the United States, its unique
position as a research organization means first that its representatives are in
a good position to detennine when U.S. patent law is ripe for change, and
second that its efforts are predisposed to well-considered advice.1 62
WIPO meets its goal of promotion of global intellectual property 163 by
using expert committees to research various intellectual property issues and
inform debate. 164 Additionally, since WIPO administers patent, trademark
and copyright treaties,165 it has the ability to look across these related fields
and find best-practices. Speaking specifically to patent prior art, WIPO and
its U.S. representative are not alone in their prior art recommendations
many U.S. commentators have found the geographic limitation on § 102(b)
unwise.1 66
•

WIPO also has incentives to continue carrying out high-quality studies.
While the new World Trade Organization ("WTO") TRIPs agreement incor
porated much of the existing WIPO regime, changes in the WIPO system
did not automatically apply to WTO members. 1 67 Nonetheless, the WIPO
interpretations of incorporated norms work to sway the WTO's decisions.1 68
To be influential, WIPO will have incentives to carry out thorough studies
and research on intellectual property topics to reach well-informed recom
mendations. Because of these efforts, even when WIPO's policies are not
expressly accepted, they still influence changes in local law.1 69 Therefore,
WIPO has been a very active organization in influencing U.S. domestic pol
1
icy through the courts 70 and has incentives to maintain this status through
well-considered and mutually beneficial research findings.
While one might argue that a U.S. court would not want to change do
mestic laws because this may result in the loss of a bargaining chip in
1 6 1 . STANDING COMM. ON THE LAW OF PATENTS, WORLD. INT'L PROPERTY 0RG., PROPOSAL
FROM THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, JAPAN AND THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE REGARDING
THE SUBSTANTIVE PATENT LAW TREATY (SPLT), SCP/ 1 0/9, at 2 (2004), available at
http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=23 766.
1 62. See WIPO's current research efforts at World Intellectual Property Organization,
www.wipo.int (last visited Jul. 27, 2005).
1 63. Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of Inter
national Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. lNT' L L. 1 , 1 2 (2004) (citing Convention
Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14, 1967, 2 1 U.S.T. 1 749, 848
U.N.T.S. (as amended on Sept. 28, 1 979), art. 3i).
1 64.

Helfer, supra note 1 63. at 1 2.

1 65.

World Intellectual Property Organization, www.wipo.int (last visited Jul. 27, 2005).

1 66. See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 147; 2 DONALD S . CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 6.02[5],
at 6-54 ( 1 996); see Daniel H. Bliss, Comment, Bridge Over Troubled Water: Extending the Public
Use Bar to Foreign Countries, 1 987 DET. C.L. REV. 65, 74-78 ( 1 987).
1 67.

David W. Leebron, The Boundaries of the WTO: Linkages, 96 A.J.I.L. 5, 19 (2002).

1 68.

Leebron, supra note 1 67, at 1 9.

1 69. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Role of National Courts: The Architecture of The Inter
national Intellectual Property System, 77 CHI-KENT L. REV. 993, 996 (2002).
1 70. See Dinwoodie, supra note 1 69, at 1005 nn.58-60 (noting the recent conclusion of trea
ties in copyright, patent and trademark law at WIPO).

November 2005]

Planting a Standard

37 1

1
international negotiations, 71 this statement does not apply well to WIPO
recommendations. Such bargaining-chip style negotiations may not be ap
propriate for refuting WIPO-based recommendations because, as mentioned,
WIPO is more than a forum for haggling outcomes-it investigates best
practices to recommend them for legislation.172 Moreover, when laws need
to adapt to a changed technology scene, instead of trying to maintain theo
retical bargaining advantages, courts should rely on the recommendations of
U.S. WIPO representatives because they have taken into account the best
interests of the United States in making their recommendation. The acting
Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has stated many of these
domestic benefits: "Harmonization promises to bring substantial benefits,
including uniform patent examination, reduced patent office workloads, and
enhanced patent quality. The sooner we can agree on a basic framework, the
sooner we can begin providing these benefits to patent applicants, patent
3
offices and the public alike."17 Because WIPO acts as more than a bargain
ing forum, applying a bargaining-chip mindset to WIPO decisions means
courts will miss the benefits of tailoring domestic laws to changing technol
ogy.
Because WIPO's recommendations are well-researched, WIPO works to
benefit member countries, and the expansion of the patent system has been
largely a function of judicial adaptation, 174 a court can safely look to WIPO
recommendations in areas of congressional silence when trying to adapt the
Patent Act to changing technology and public accessibility. The Elsner court
has already proposed a test that takes an affirmative step toward harmoniza
tion that the international community believes could usefully apply to all
objects. Subsequent courts should follow the WIPO recommendations and

1 7 1 . See Harold C. Wegner, Elsner: Judicial Drive to Eliminate the Territoriality Limitations
of "Prior Art, " 23 BIOTECH. L. REP. 747 (2004).
1 72. For instance, WIPO leads investigations to find out how IP rights affect traditional
knowledge. INTERGOV'TAL COMM. ON INTEL. PROP. AND GENETIC RESOURCES, WORLD INT'L PROP
ERTY 0RG., INTELLECTUAL NEEDS AND EXPECTATIONS OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE HOLDERS
( 1 998-99) (200
I), http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/tk/ffm/report/final/index.html (last visited Jan. 16,
2005); see also Overview of WIPO's Activities & Services, http://www.wipo.int/activities/en (last
visited Oct. 7, 2005) ("WIPO carries out a wide variety of activities and services in its work. These
include establishing international standards for intellectual property laws and practices and provid
ing registration services that allow patents, trademarks, and designs to be protected in many
countries. WIPO also extends various technical and legal assistance to developing countries, facili
tates resolution of intellectual property disputes, and explores new issues arising in the global
intellectual property arena. In all these activities, the latest information technologies are employed
to promote efficiency and facilitate the electronic exchanges of information on intellectual prop
erty. ").
1 73. STATEMENT OF JoN DUDAS, UNDER SEC. OF COMMERCE FOR INTEL. PROP. AND ACTING
DIR. OF THE U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, available at www.uspto.gov (last visited Janu
ary 6, 2005).
1 74. Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization art. 3, July 14,
1 967, 2 1 U.S.T. 1749, 1 1 54 U.N.T.S. 437 (as amended Dec. 2 1 , 1 979) ("(i) to promote the protec
tion of intellectual property throughout the world through cooperation among States and, where
appropriate, in collaboration among the Unions "); see also Vision and Strategic Direction of WIPO,
www.wipo.org/about-wipo/en/dgo/pub487.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2005).
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interpret Elsner to encompass "widgets" as well as asexually reproducing
plants.
C ONCLUSION

An examination of the congressional and judicial sources shows that
courts should broadly apply Eisner 's possession test to§ 1 0 1 inventions and
thereby change the § 1 02 bar for inventions patentable under § 1 0 1 to the
same standard that it applied for plants. This Note first examined the con
gressional sources to show a history of a flexible test--one that does not
prejudice any objects under the Patent Act. It then showed that past interpre
tations of the Patent Act adapted general standards for new circumstances
instead of creating exceptions for certain inventions to suggest that plants
should not be excluded from the general provisions of the Patent Act with
out express congressional language. It used In re A rgoudelis to show that
since the problems of In re Elsner are not unique to plants, reading Elsner to
create a plant-specific exception would be to apply it arbitrarily. Finally, this
Note argued that for intellectual property there are many reasons to regard
the recommendations of international bodies--even if at the risk of losing a
U.S. bargaining-chip. Thus, interpreting the Patent Act according to current
domestic and international trends leads to a broad reading of Elsner that
would apply its "possession test" to all utility inventions and would further
harmonize U.S. with foreign law.

